Donald Trump-Philips corporation conflict on coronavirus

This 20 March 2020 video from the USA says about itself:

Rep. Judy Chu responds to Trump’s repeated ‘Chinese virus’ rhetoric

Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus chair Rep. Judy Chu (Democratic-California) said March 20 that President Trump’s rhetoric is a “deliberate attempt” to distract from his coronavirus failings. Read more here.

So, billionaire Donald Trump not only wants to grab German coronavirus vaccine research

Translated from Dutch NOS radio today

Philips afraid of US American grab at respiratory equipment

Philips fears that with strict legislation the US will demand respirators destined for the European market, NRC daily reports. The Dutch manufacturer of healthcare equipment is afraid that Philips Respironics in the US American city of Pittsburgh will be brought under the Defense Production Act. This 1950 law, from the time of the Korean War, allows President Trump to grab the production and supply of respirators. Philips would then be forced to only supply the American market.

Advertising con men, bad PSV football sponsors

This January 2018 video says about itself:

Known Forex Scams To Avoid: Forex Robot Scams, Fake Brokers & Spread Manipulation ☠️

Forex can be a really shady place to be involved in and there are a lot of scams out there.

1) Managing money service – someone in a social forum or bar trying to convince you to give him money to manage it for you. Obviously, there are proper management fund services out there and hedge funds (that are regulated) if you want to do this.
2) Fake brokers – not regulated or clones of regulated firms or brokers with a fake regulation website.
3) Robots – not all automated systems are scams but there are robots being advertised like fruit machine slot robots.
4) Spread manipulation – not so much anymore, especially regulated firms can’t get away with this anymore. But with unregulated brokers, it is a different story…

Translated from Dutch NOS TV today:

PSV sponsor in controversy because of ‘shady fake ads’

The Investous corporation will continue to be an official PSV sponsor until the end of next year. That says a spokesperson for the Eindhoven football club now that the company has been discredited due to fraudulent practices. In the TV program ‘Opgelicht’ [Deceived], it turned out yesterday evening that the sponsor uses ads to seduce gullible people to invest in bitcoins, gold or shares.

Fake ads on social media lead to fake news articles with made-up quotes from Dutch celebrities such as Waylon or Jort Kelder. The articles resemble pieces from the NOS or the Volkskrant daily. Whoever clicks through is brought into contact with ‘brokers’, who then offer extremely risky investments. Investous turns out to be the company behind these advertisements.

According to the research program, the chance that the investments will generate a profit is only ten percent. Several people have lost tens of thousands of euros because of the advertisements, Omroep Brabant regional broadcasting organisation writes.

Not illegal

Investous does not do anything illegal. The company is based in Cyprus, where supervision is much more superficial than in the Netherlands. PSV spokesperson Thijs Slegers tells in the TV program that five complaints about the sponsor have arrived at the club. PSV has asked the company to take the complaints seriously and resolve them.

Investous did not want to appear in front of the camera of the TV program.

The NOS article does not mention another, bigger sponsor of PSV: Philips corporation. Philips in fact founded PSV in 1913. Recently, Philips is involved in briberry scandals; eg, in Poland and in Brazil.

Dutch Philips corporation’s Brazilian bribery scandal

This 21 August 2019 video is called Philips, Under Investigation In U.S. And Brazil, Fired Whistleblower Who Warned Of Graft.

There are not just Philips scandals in the USA and Brazil; in Poland as well (also bribery); in South Africa as well; in the Netherlands, where they are not paying taxes, as well.

From Reuters news agency today:

Exclusive: Philips, under investigation in U.S. and Brazil, fired whistleblower who warned of graft

By Brad Brooks

SAO PAULO, August 21 – Healthcare giant Philips was warned of suspicious sales of its medical equipment to the Brazilian government, and failed to halt them, nearly a decade before an alleged bribery racket was exposed in the company’s Brazil operations last year, Reuters has learned.

Claims of malfeasance reached the highest levels of the Dutch conglomerate as early as 2010, according to court records filed by federal prosecutors, internal company documents and Reuters interviews with a former manager at a Philips subsidiary in Brazil who says he told superiors of the suspected scheme and was later sacked.

That ex-employee, Jose Israel Masiero Filho, a former supply-chain executive with Dixtal Biomedica Industria e Comercio Ltda., spoke extensively with Reuters in his first interview with foreign media. He said in January 2010 he spotted irregularities in three deals to sell Philips and Dixtal equipment to an obscure Brazilian middleman who had landed big contracts with Brazil’s Ministry of Health. Masiero said he suspected payoffs had been used to secure that government business, allegations now at the heart of a burgeoning graft probe in Brazil, court records show.

Masiero emailed an internal Philips hotline immediately to report his suspicions, met soon after with the company’s top compliance officer, and alerted at least three other senior executives during 2010. Among them was Steve Rusckowski, former chief executive of Philips Healthcare, the company’s largest division. Masiero’s warnings were detailed in emails, internal company memos and court records viewed by Reuters.

“Philips should consider that by approving and accepting these sales, it will be involved in illegal activities if discovered,” Masiero wrote to Rusckowski in an email dated October 14, 2010.

Still, Koninklijke Philips (PHG.AS), as the company is formally known, continued to sell to the Brazilian intermediary to fulfill the Health Ministry contracts, invoices show.

Rusckowski, who served as Philips Healthcare’s chief executive until April 2012, did not respond to requests for comment. He is now CEO of New Jersey-based Quest Diagnostics (DGX.N).

In an emailed statement to Reuters, Philips said it is cooperating with Brazilian authorities investigating the nation’s medical device industry. The company said it launched an internal investigation in 2010 in response to an “anonymous complaint” but “did not identify direct evidence of wrongdoing.” The company said it did, however, tighten up its internal control processes in Brazil.

Philips would not discuss ex-employee Masiero or the circumstances surrounding his dismissal.

Brazil’s Health Ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

Philips is now among the targets in a widening investigation into medical contracting graft in Brazil that authorities say is still in its early stages, and which has sparked additional probes by U.S. law enforcement.

Masiero is cooperating with Brazilian prosecutors. They allege Philips and other multinationals conspired with intermediaries to pay bribes for public contracts, charging Brazil’s state healthcare system inflated prices to recoup the cost of the kickbacks. Twenty four people were charged last year in connection with the alleged scheme. All are currently on trial in Rio de Janeiro.

Germany’s Siemens AG (SIEGn.DE) and the American firms Johnson & Johnson (JNJ.N), General Electric Co (GE.N) and Stryker Corp (SYK.N), all major manufacturers of medical devices, have been swept up in the probe.

Johnson & Johnson, Siemens and GE declined to comment. They previously denied wrongdoing and said they were cooperating with the investigation. Stryker said it was committed to working in an ethical manner and that it was unable to comment further.

In the United States, the FBI, Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have launched their own investigations into suspected corruption in sales of medical equipment in Brazil as well as China, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

The whistleblower Masiero said he is cooperating with all those agencies, an assertion confirmed in emails viewed by Reuters. The Justice Department, SEC and FBI all declined to comment.

Philips told Reuters it is “reviewing” inquiries from the Justice Department and SEC in connection with the Brazil probe.


Now 52, Masiero was hired in 2006 to be Dixtal’s exports manager, rising to become the top logistics and supply chain executive for the Sao Paulo-based medical device firm in early 2009. Philips purchased Dixtal in 2008.

In early 2010, Masiero noticed what he considered irregularities with three large contracts awarded by Brazil’s Health Ministry. The deals, one for 750 Philips heart defibrillators, the others for a total of 3,972 Dixtal vital-signs monitors, were worth a combined 68.9 million reis (about $40 million at the time), government records show.

Masiero said he found it odd that Philips did not compete directly for such a major piece of business. Neither Philips or Dixtal submitted bids, according to government records of tender competitors viewed by Reuters.

Instead the contracts were won by Rizzi Comercio e Representacoes Ltda., a little-known Brazilian medical supply firm. Masiero, tasked with getting the equipment to Rizzi Comercio, was surprised to find its billing address was a tiny storefront with peeling purple paint in a dilapidated Sao Paulo neighborhood.

“It was an immediate red flag for me,” Masiero told Reuters.

In addition, the Health Ministry was paying well above market prices for the equipment, Masiero said, unusual for a large customer with buying clout. On February 12, 2010, for example, Masiero allegedly received an email from a Philips’ sales executive, Frederik Knudsen, directing him to deliver the first shipment of 60 defibrillators to Rizzi Comercio, which marked up those devices an additional 67%, according to correspondence included in court records.

“The value that should be on the order is what was agreed to with the Health Ministry” – $16,700 per unit – “and not what we sold them to Rizzi for ($9,991),” according to the email allegedly from Knudsen, which was seen by Reuters.

Prosecutors say Philips and Rizzi Comercio conspired to disguise and recoup the cost of bribes through inflated prices, fleecing Brazilian taxpayers in the process.

Knudsen, whom Philips confirmed still works for them, is now among those on trial in Rio. So is Daurio Speranzini, who led Philips Healthcare’s operations in Latin America for seven years before joining GE in 2011. He left that firm last December. Both men were charged last August with racketeering and fraud.

Knudsen’s lawyers did not respond to requests for comment. In a written defense filed with the court, they said Knudsen did not set Philips’ prices and that he is innocent. In a separate court filing, they also questioned the veracity of the emails their client allegedly sent to Masiero.

Speranzini’s lawyers referred questions to their written defense, which contends he had no knowledge of the alleged bribery scheme or of Masiero’s warnings.

Also on trial for racketeering and fraud are two brothers who own Rizzi Comercio, Wlademir and Adalberto Rizzi.

Their lawyer, who did not respond to requests for comment, said in court filings that her clients engaged in no illegal activities.


Uneasy about the deals with Rizzi Comercio, Masiero on January 20, 2010, notified Philips’ global compliance team in Amsterdam through an email hotline.

Philips sent Caroline Visser, then-chief of Philips’ global compliance, to Brazil to meet with Masiero in March 2010. She promised a swift investigation, according to emails the pair exchanged.

Two months later, Masiero was transferred from Dixtal to a logistics post within Philips in Sao Paulo, a move he considered a demotion and an effort to silence him. The shipments continued, invoices show.

Frustrated, Masiero on October 14, 2010, sent an email to Rusckowski, the head of Philips’ healthcare division.

Masiero expressed concern about Rizzi Comercio and its use of an unfamiliar intermediary, Moses Trading American, to purchase the U.S.-made Philips heart defibrillators on its behalf for export to Brazil. Far more typical, Masiero told Reuters, would be for Philips to sell directly to Rizzi.

Masiero’s uneasiness only increased when he traced Moses Trading American’s address on Philips’ invoices to a private home on a golf course in suburban Phoenix.

“Moses Trading selling operation is clearly suspicious,” Masiero wrote to Rusckowski.

According to emails reviewed by Reuters, Rusckowski forwarded Masiero’s message to Clement Revetti, Jr., the chief legal officer for Philips Healthcare. Revetti thanked Masiero and asked him not to contact the CEO again.

Masiero defied that order. On November 9, 2010, he again emailed Rusckowski and Revetti of his concerns.

On March 4, 2011, Masiero says he discussed his suspicions once more in person in Sao Paulo with Visser, the compliance head. He was fired later that day. Masiero said he was given no reason for his dismissal. Paperwork required under Brazilian labor laws shows Philips sacked Masiero “without cause”, meaning the company made no claims that it was performance-related.

Visser and Revetti did not respond to requests for comment.

As for Moses Trading American, Brazilian prosecutors say that operation is run by a Peruvian named Oscar Moses whom they are investigating in connection with a string of allegedly fraudulent medical equipment deals in Brazil. He has not been charged with a crime.

Moses did not respond to requests to comment sent to his Linkedin and Facebook profiles.


Discouraged after his firing, Masiero dropped the matter.

Then in 2014, Brazil was engulfed by a corruption scandal centered on contracting graft at state oil company Petrobras (PETR4.SA). That blockbuster probe, known as Car Wash, ultimately toppled leaders at the highest levels of Brazilian business and politics.

Masiero got in touch with federal prosecutors.

“His information was key to helping us break up this scheme,” said Marisa Ferrari, a lead prosecutor on the case.

Masiero, meanwhile, is unemployed. He said he has been blacklisted in Brazil.

He and his family recently left Brazil for a country Masiero does not want to name.

Did Philips help NSA spying on Mandela?

This 13 December 2013 video from the USA says about itself:

“One of Our Greatest Coups”: The CIA & the Capture of Nelson Mandela

As South Africa prepares to hold a state funeral for Nelson Mandela, we look at how the CIA helped the South African [apartheid regime] track down and capture Nelson Mandela in 1962.

In 1990, the Cox News Service quoted a former U.S. official saying that within hours after Mandela’s arrest a senior CIA operative named Paul Eckel admitted the agency’s involvement. Eckel was reported as having told the official, “We have turned Mandela over to the South African security branch. We gave them every detail, what he would be wearing, the time of day, just where he would be. They have picked him up. It is one of our greatest coups.”

Several news outlets have reported the actual source of the tip that led to the arrest of Mandela was a CIA official named Donald Rickard. On Thursday, Democracy Now! attempted to reach Rickard at his home in Colorado. On two occasions, a man who picked up the phone hung up when we asked to speak with Donald Rickard. The activist group RootsAction has launched a campaign to urge the CIA to open its files on Mandela and South Africa and the media watchdog group Fairness in Accuracy in Reporting has questioned why corporate media outlets have largely ignored the story. We speak to journalist Andrew Cockburn who first reported on the CIA link to Mandela’s arrest in 1986 in the New York Times.

Translated from Dutch weekly De Groene, 7 August 2017:

Investigation: How Philips made a Dutch pocket telex “spyable” for the NSA

Encrypted, but not for America

Intelligence services fear that China will gain access to our secrets thanks to built-in back doors in Huawei equipment. The USA has had those back doors for a long time. At the end of the last century, for example, Philips made a difficult to crack pocket telex “spyable” for the NSA. A reconstruction.

By Huub Jaspers and Marcel Metze

Spring 2014. In a family restaurant in the woods around Eindhoven we find a source, let’s call him “Frank Molenaar”. The case on which he is going to provide us with information played in the mid-nineteen eighties. Yet he still wants to remain anonymous. The conversation takes place in a private dining room, without viewers or listeners. “What we are talking about was state secret at the time”, he explains, “public disclosure was punishable by imprisonment.” Is that still true? The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) believes that the issue must remain secret for more than thirty years after that date. It rejects a request for disclosure. The then deputy director Marc Kuipers writes: “One of the (…) grounds for refusal is that the provision of the requested data must not harm national security. (…) The AIVD must be able to keep its sources, its working methods (…) and its current level of knowledge secret.”

This answer makes the story of “Frank Molenaar” all the more fascinating. It is about the NSA and how the US American eavesdropping service called in Philips to remove an encrypted pocket telex from the market. That pocket telex – a text device avant la lettre – was developed by the Dutch small business Text Lite. The encryption program that Text Lite had built in was difficult to crack even for the NSA. Something had to be done about it, the Americans thought.

What makes the issue even more fascinating is that the ANC would have used the pocket telex to transfer secret messages from Nelson Mandela – who was then imprisoned on Robben Island – from Zambia to London. Dutch activist Connie Braam had given the device to the ANC. This raises the question: has Philips helped the NSA to intercept Mandela?

Philips had been in contact with the NSA for some time. Subsidiary USFA – an abbreviation for Ultra Sonore Manufacturing Department – built cryptographic devices intended for sending and receiving encrypted diplomatic and military communications. But the development costs were high and sales outside the Netherlands were limited. That changed in 1977. That year, a USFA employee traveled to the NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, not far from Washington. What he discussed is unknown. What is certain is that it did not end with this one visit and that Philips USFA has since been on a leash of the NSA.

In addition to spying, the NSA also dealt with the development and construction of cryptographic machines and associated software. Shortly after the visit of the USFA employee, the NSA chose Philips as a subcontractor. The Dutch corporation was allowed to build a license for an NSA device for encrypted data transmission for the European NATO countries. Of course, that device contained an encryption program developed by the NSA itself, the so-called Walburn algorithm. Philips also installed another NSA encryption (Saville, developed by the NSA and the British GCHQ) in its new communication equipment for the Dutch army.

Since the alliance with the NSA, USFA had done significantly better commercially. So when the Americans presented themselves with a special request, Philips was open to that. According to “Frank Molenaar” – who was involved in the case in an undefined role – a secret meeting took place somewhere in the Netherlands in December 1984 where employees of both Philips and the NSA were present. The official language was English. The subject: a new encryption program for the PX-1000, the pocket telex that Text Lite had launched in 1983.

It was quickly clear to the Philips cryptographers that the new encryption was weaker than the encryption that Text Lite had built into the device, and would therefore be easier for the Americans to crack. They also understood the reason for this: a eavesdropping service must be able to eavesdrop, and therefore it is not in the interests of citizens and businesses to use devices that make it all that difficult.

The PX-1000 measured approximately twenty by ten centimeters and was equipped with a small display and a keyboard. You could type messages and send them as beeps via a normal telephone line to another PX-1000, which then made them text again – provided the owner had the correct encryption key. The device cost around a thousand guilders and would now be worth around 860 euros. By the time the NSA got wind of it, Text Lite had already sold quite a few of it, including to the Turkish army, in the Middle East and to Israel.

The company was still young, it was set up in 1981 as a producer of light newspapers – light bars with current advertising texts. The PX-1000 was an idea of technical director Hugo Krop. Krop had added ‘a very naughty feature’ to the PX-1000 on his own initiative, he said a few months before his death, in 2018. “Not because someone asked for it, but simply because it was possible.” In a hacker magazine from the USA he had read ‘how you could make the official Data Encryption Standard from America in about 1 K (1000 bits)’. There was just room for such a mini-file on the PX-1000 chip. …

Krop’s co-director Arie Hommel remembered how after the introduction of the PX-1000, Text Lite received signals that people in security circles were not happy with their beautiful device. “Occasionally someone from England came over from Scotland Yard to ask why and to whom we sold those things. They seemed to be bothered by it because they could not listen to them. And they were not the only ones. ”

The NSA was also not happy. The Americans did not contact Text Lite themselves, but engaged Philips for that job. Neither Hommel nor Krop remembered the date of the phone call from Eindhoven, but that must have been somewhere in 1984, before Text Lite went public (that happened in December, via a listing on the Amsterdam parallel market). Hommel: “We were asked to come to a Van der Valk hotel near Utrecht. That’s where the Philips people said extremely harshly: you have a product that contains encryption and we want to get rid of that. ”

According to Krop, their conversation partners were USFA employees. He confirmed Hommel’s description of the conversation: “They presented themselves with a proposal: a) how much money do you want, b) do you want to track down and buy back all devices and c) we will give you a new, at least as good, encryption key and then go we distribute that device. And by the way: this is not an offer that you can refuse. You just have to do it.” According to Arie Hommel, it was not clear that this offer was inspired by the NSA, but Hugo Krop suspected it. During a conversation with the radio program Argos, he spontaneously dropped: “Yes, if the NSA wants something, they will always get it done.”

The Text Lite directors agreed – partly enticed by an amount that according to Hommel was somewhere between thirty and forty million guilders. Philips took over the PX-1000 and tried to trace as many unsold copies as possible. It is not known whether copies have been retrieved that had already been sold. In 1990 the anti-militarist action group Onkruit occupied the USFA complex and thereby seized internal documents. It turned out that Philips resold twelve thousand PX-1000s, along with another twenty thousand chips with the DES-algorithm, to the American company Reynolds – which can no longer be traced and, according to various anonymous sources, has probably been a cover for the NSA. The selling price was around 16.5 million guilders – which roughly corresponds to the retail value.

It was a sad moment in Philips history. The corporation had once set up USFA at the request of the Dutch government. It had been warned in 1944 by its top cryptologist Colonel J. A. Verkuijl that the US had almost reached the point where it could crack the Swiss Hagelin coders used by the Netherlands.

Immediately after the war, Philips had advised the government to build its own cryptographic devices. That would reduce the chance of American hacks. By developing high-quality cryptographic technology itself, the Netherlands would also have the chance to be admitted to the exclusive group of countries that shared secret intelligence: the US, the United Kingdom and Canada (this club was later expanded to include Australia and New Zealand and became known under the nickname Five Eyes). …

The first secret telex was not ready for production until 1957. In 1962, USFA had won a NATO bid with its Ecolex IV telex, so that success seemed within reach. But competition from German (Siemens, AEG), British, Swedish / Swiss (Hagelin), Norwegian (SATK) and American sides was fierce. It had taken until 1977 – the year of the NSA alliance – for USFA to once again win a NATO bid, this time with the secret telex Aroflex. What had begun as an attempt to prevent American eavesdropping had ended in cryptological dependence on those same Americans.

Thanks to the stories of ‘Frank Molenaar’, from a few other anonymous sources and from the Text Lite directors Krop and Hommel, it is clear how the NSA, with the help of Philips, removed the overly encrypted PX-1000 from the market and replaced it with a new version PX-1000Cr. What they could not answer were two other questions: how much weaker was the new encryption of the PX-1000, and did the ANC actually use the device in communication between Mandela and ANC-London?

It took five years before we found the answers to those questions. Marc Simons and Paul Reuvers helped us analyze the weakened algorithm in the PX-1000Cr. They are the owners of a software company in Eindhoven and have set up a virtual “cryptomuseum” in their free time. They also collect as many old crypto devices as possible. Simons and Reuvers had copies of the original PX-1000 and the weakened PX-1000Cr. They succeeded in reading out the memories and schematically drawing out the encryption algorithms in both versions.

Bart Jacobs, professor of cyber security in Nijmegen, found an interested student, who only needed three months to come to the conclusion that the original version indeed contained the decryption algorithm. A second student would continue the research, but was offered a job even before graduating. The only man who could give a definitive answer is Cees Jansen, a mathematician and cryptographer who worked at USFA in the 1980s. However, he did not want to go into detail. After some insistence, Jansen appeared willing to look more closely at the algorithm scheme of the weakened PX-1000CR, as made by the men of the cryptomuseum, together with professor Bart Jacobs.

In an Argos radio broadcast, Jansen described this algorithm as “clearly weaker” and confirmed that the NSA should have been able to crack it much faster than the DES-algorithm in the original PX-1000. Our anonymous source “Frank Molenaar” had told us that this weakening amounted to a halving of the number of bits per encryption block: that made use of 64-bit blocks, the NSA backdoor used 32-bit blocks. Professor Bart Jacobs explains that this amounts to a weakening of 2 to power 32, or a factor of more than four billion. That is huge. Suppose the NSA computer had taken a year to crack a DES-message, that time would have been reduced to 0.007 – or seven thousandth – seconds via the weakened back door.

In 2010, the TV program Andere tijden dedicated a broadcast to Operation Vula. It had set up the ANC in the mid-1980s to steer diverted ANC fighters back into South Africa and to set up a communication line with Nelson Mandela. Mandela was still imprisoned on Robben Island at the time, but his release was already expected (eventually it only came in 1990). Andere tijden revealed that the Dutch anti-apartheid movement had played a role in Operation Vula in all sorts of ways.

Activist Connie Braam, eg, had acquired some copies of the original PX-1000 and gave them to the ANC. Were they used too? The man who knows all about this is the white South African writer Timothy Jenkin. At the time, he was responsible for the secret communication within the ANC. His famous escape in 1979 from a heavily guarded prison in Pretoria is currently being filmed with Daniel “Harry Potter” Radcliffe in the lead role. Jenkin confirms by telephone that the ANC has used the PX-1000. But only within Europe: “For communication between London and Amsterdam, and later also between London and Paris.” The PX-1000 turned out to be unsuitable for communication between Zambia and London and was therefore not used for messages from Mandela, says Jenkin. High-quality and interference-free lines were required to transfer the encrypted audio signals via the telephone without error. “We tested it. It worked well from a quiet hotel room, but not from public telephone booths.”

Has the NSA intercepted and cracked the ANC European PX-1000 communication? We do not know. Perhaps the answer will one day come from declassified NSA archives. And has the NSA benefited from the “back door” that Philips put in it? That too remains a mystery. Not long after the acquisition, Philips launched the new version of the PX-1000 in 1985 with the addition of “Cr” (for crypto) and the new, weaker algorithm. Text Lite took care of the production and also developed a successor: PX-2000 (1985), which was “backward compatible” with the PX-1000 and probably also contained the back door. The devices were also sold under license and under different brand names (Siemens, Alcatel, Ericsson) in a number of European countries, such as Germany, England, France, Austria and Sweden. It is not clear whether the back door was in it, it is possible that the manufacturers involved have replaced this with their own encryption algorithms. There was also a version for the Dutch government. The weakened algorithm was not there, the government had its own encryption developed for which the details are unknown to date.

In any case, one conclusion remains: since Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, we know that the NSA goes very far in monitoring global electronic communications. The story of the PX-1000 is not very important on a global scale. But it is significant that the NSA also spent quite a bit of money and energy back then to ensure that electronic communication devices could be monitored. There is no reason to believe that the service has stopped that.

One last question remains: who actually made that weakened algorithm, that back door in the PX-1000? At the end of the conversation in the family restaurant in the woods near Eindhoven, “Frank Molenaar” leans towards us. “I would just like to emphasize that this algorithm did not come from Philips,” he says. “It came from the USA, it came from the NSA.”

Philips, AkzoNobel corporations not paying taxes

This video from Britain says about itself:

How the Rich Beat the Taxman (2010)

With more than 20 millionaires in the UK cabinet, reporter Antony Barnett examines the financial affairs of some ministers and others who have helped the government.

[Conservative minister] George Osborne says ‘we’re all in this together’ but are ministers and top Tories paying the same rates of tax as the rest of us? Barnett visits a number of offshore tax havens around the world still under control of Britain, including the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, to find out more about tax avoidance ploys.

It is not only Shell oil corporation dodging taxes in the Netherlands

Translated from Dutch NOS TV today:

Philips also pays no corporate income tax in the Netherlands at the moment, and AkzoNobel pays hardly any. That’s what company directors said in a round table discussion about tax payments by multinational corporations in parliament.

Philips in Poland suspected of bribery

Philips logo

Translated from NOS TV in the Netherlands:

Philips in Poland suspected of bribery

Added: Tuesday, May 17, 2011, 6:01

By reporter Gert-Jan Dennekamp and Marc Bessant

Philips employees in Poland are accused of systematically bribing hospital administrators. The coming months three former executives of Philips will be on trial in Poland on charges of bribery. The Polish prosecutor suspects the electronics group of setting up a special fund for bribes. This shows from documents in the possession of the NOS and the Financieele Dagblad daily.

“All profits of Philips in Poland have been obtained by crime,” said a witness for the Polish public prosecutor, Marian Kulig. He worked as a broker and delivered Philips CT scanners and other equipment to hospitals.

Kulig said he had distributed more than one million euros in bribes. That money was partly from the Philips plant in Hamburg, which, according to the Polish prosecutor’s, managed the special fund of bribery money.


Between 2000 and 2007, Kulig bribed hospital managers. The directors then changed the technical requirements in their contracts so that only Philips equipment would fit. The equipment was then delivered through Kulig’s company or by Philips itself.

After he fell out with the Polish Philips bosses, Kulig in 2007 went with his accusations to the Polish public prosecutor’s. On June 13 23 people, including three Philips executives, will stand trial at the court in Katowice.

The bosses now no longer work for Philips. Philips acknowledges the investigation, but does not want to comment with the trial pending.

Investigation in the U.S.

The company also launched its own investigation because the American justice department has asked Philips for clarification on this matter.

The headquarters of the medical department of Philips are in the U.S.A. The past two years the government there has focused mainly on addressing corruption in the medical sector.

This case could have major financial implications for Philips. In investigations into other companies, U.S. Justice has imposed big fines. Thus in 2008, Siemens received a record fine of 600 million U.S. dollars more, according to The Guardian

for bribing public officials. This spring the medical company Johnson & Johnson was fined $ 70,000,000.

According to the New York Times, $81 million.

UPDATE: according to StatCounter, people at the Groenendael Philips Management Training Center in Amsterdam have read this blog post. It is to be hoped that it will stimulate them to do something against this culture of corruption.

UPDATE 18 May 2011: also Philips kickbacks in other east European countries?

Philips medical branch accused of fraud in Brazil: here.

Viji Sundaram, New America Media: “U.S. pharmaceutical companies have moved their operations overseas in the past decade, testing their drugs on poor people in such lands as Russia, China, Brazil and Romania… One country that has experienced a boom like no other in this industry is India, with its widely spoken English, an established medical infrastructure and welcoming attitudes towards foreign industry. Most importantly, these pharmaceutical companies are exploiting the country’s vast number of illiterate and poor people who are willing to become guinea pigs”.

Greenpeace criticizes Philips corporation for greenwashing

This is a video of Greenpeace in the Netherlands, about Philips products dumped in Ghana and polluting the environment there.

From Greenpeace:

“Sense and Simplicity” – or simply nonsense?

10 June 2008

“Sense and Simplicity” became the slogan of the Dutch electronics giant, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV – better known as Philips – in 2004. But when it comes to taking responsibility for the electronic waste (e-waste) generated by their products, we don’t think they’ve been showing much of either. So, this morning we paid them a visit – at their head offices in Denmark, India, Russia and the Netherlands, demanding they adopt a sensible policy and simply stop dumping e-waste.

Greenpeace activists delivered 500 Philips television sets and 100 pieces of Philips electronic equipment to the company’s headquarters in Amsterdam. The e-waste was obtained from an e-waste trader; this very same e-waste would most probably have ended up on a scrapyard in countries like China, India or in Africa.